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FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
The Responsibilities of Federal Courts in
Post-Conviction Proceedings
Sanders v. United States,' together with Townsend v.
Sain2 and Fay v. Noia,3 form a trilogy of guideline decisions
in which the Supreme ,Court has undertaken to restate the
responsibilities of the federal courts in federal post-conviction proceedings. By this act a dissenting minority believe that a new doctrine of federal habeas corpus has been
established. The sole problem which faces the Supreme
Court in these cases is that of successive applications for
collateral relief.4 Sain and Noia relate to federal habeas
corpus proceedings arising from state criminal convictions,
while Sanders involves successive applications arising from
a federal conviction.
In Sanders v. United States,5 the petitioner -had been
convicted on a bank robbery charge. The United States District Court, Northern District of California, denied, without a hearing, the petitioner's motions to -set aside and
vacate conviction. The first motion alleged no facts but
only bare conclusions in support of his claim. The second,
filed eight months after the first, alleged facts, which, if
true, might entitle him to relief. On appeal from the denial
of the second motion, the Court of Appeals affirmed. On
certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the "similar relief"
provision of 28 U.S.C. § 2255,6 authorizing a motion to
1

83 S. Ct. 1068 (1963).

372 U.S. 293, 83 S. Ct. 745 (1963).
372 U.S. 391, 83 S. Ct. 822 (1963).
4
Supra note 1 at 1077.
5 Id. at 1068.
6 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1959) provides: "A prisoner in custody under
sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the
right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States,
or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence,
or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by
law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the
court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct
the sentence.
2

3
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vacate, set aside, and correct a sentence is the equivalent of
28 U.S.C. § 2244, 7 relating to successive applications for
habeas corpus. The sentencing court erred in not granting
a hearing on the second motion.
In Townsend v. Sain,8 where it could not be ascertained
by the district court what standard the trial judge had
applied in admitting a confession, an evidentiary hearing

was ordered in a federal court. The trial judge had instructed the jurors that they could disregard the defendant's confession if they believed defendant's expert witness who
testified concerning a drug injection. The trial court had
made no express finding and no implied finding could be

reconstructed. Previous habeas corpus petitions had been
denied without evidentiary hearings. The Supreme Court
declared that a federal court must grant an evidentiary
hearing to a habeas cor2pus applicant if (1) the -merits of
the factual dispute were not resolved in a state hearing; (2)
a state factual determination was not fairly supported by
the record as a whole; (3) a fact finding procedure in a
state court was not adequate to -afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there was a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the state court hearing; or (6) if for any
"A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
"The sentencing court shall not -be required to entertain a second
or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.
"An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner
who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this
section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant
has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced
him, or that such court -had denied him relief, unless it also appears
that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the
legality of his detention."
7 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1958) provides: "No circuit or district judge
shall be required to entertain an application for a writ of habeas
corpus to inquire into the detention of a court of the United States,
or of a State, if it appears that the legality of such detention
has been determined by a judge or court of the United States on a
prior application for a writ of habeas corpus and the petition
presents no new ground not theretofore presented and determined,
and the judge or court is satisfied that the ends of justice will
not be served by such inquiry."
8 Supra note 2.
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reason it appeared that the state trier of fact did not afford
an application for a full and fair fact hearing.9
The petitioner in Fay v. Noia10 applied for a writ of
habeas corpus on the ground of deprivation of his constitutional rights because of his conviction on the basis of a
coerced confession. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's failure to appeal his conviction of murder was not
an intelligent and understanding waiver of his right to
appeal -and did not justify a withholding of federal habeas
corpus relief.
The Supreme Court, in each of the three cases, accepts
the familiar principle that "res judicata is inapplicable in
habeas proceedings,"" but specifies in Sanders that controlling weight may be given to a denial of a prior application for federal habeas corpus or § 2255 relief only if certain conditions exist.' 2 These conditions form the basis for
a so-called new doctrine of federal habeas corpus. 13 First,
the same ground presented in the subsequent application
must have been determined adversely to the applicant on
the prior application. Ground means simply a sufficient
legal basis for granting the relief sought by the applicant.
Identical grounds, however, may often be proved by different factual allegations or be supported by different legal
arguments.' 4 Should doubt arise whether two grounds of
successive application for relief are identical, it should be
resolved in favor of the applicant. 15
Second, the prior denial must have rested on an adjudication on the merits of the ground presented in the
subsequent application. If factual issues were raised in
the prior application, and it was not denied on the basis
9 Id. at 757.
3.
11 Id. at 423 and 840.
12 Supra note 1 at 1077.
10 Supra note

1a Id. at 1081.
14 Wilson v. Cook, 327 U.S. 474, 481 (1946).

15 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244, 2255 (1958).
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that the files and records conclusively resolved these issues,
an evidentiary hearing must be held. 16
Third, even if the same ground was rejected on the
merits of a prior application, the applicant may prove that
the ends of justice would be served by permitting a redetermination of the ground. If factual issues are involved, the
applicant is entitled to a new hearing upon showing that
the evidentiary hearing on the prior application was not
full and fair. 7
Fourth, if a petitioner deliberately withholds one of two
grounds for federal collateral relief at the time of filing
his first application, or deliberately abandons one of his
grounds at his first hearing, he may be deemed to have
waived his right to a hearing on the second application
presenting the withheld ground.' 8
Fifth, the burden is on the Government to plead abuse
of the writ. "If the government chooses not to deny the
allegation or to question its sufficiency and desires instead
to claim that the petitioner has abused the writ of habeas
corpus, it rests with the Government to make the claim with
clarity and particularity...".19
Finally, the filing of successive applications for habeas
corpus, does not compel the judge to decline to entertain
successive applications because the ground asserted was
previously heard and decided. It merely permits the judge
to do so, and only if he is satisfied that the ends of justice
will not be served by inquiring into the merits.20
The dissent in Sanders makes a strong objection to this
new doctrine of habeas corpus. "The over-all effect of this
trilogy is to relegate to a back seat. . .the principle that
Motley v. United States, 230 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1956).
17 Supra note 1 at 1078.
16

18 Supra note 15.

19 Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 292 (1948).
20

Supra note 15.
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there must be some end to litigation."''1

This objection is
particularly answered by the court in declaring that conventional notions of finality -in criminal litigation cannot
be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that
federal constitutional rights of personal liberty are not to
be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary fed22
eral judicial review.

Whether this is a new doctrine of federal habeas corpus
or merely a restatement of established principles in federal
post-conviction proceedings, the Supreme Court has recognized the need for clarification in this vital area of the law.
With any set of new rules or principles, broad or narrow,
there are bound to be unintended consequences. Is -it better,
then, to begin with established rules to determine the legal
answer or must each case be adjudicated individually, on a
case-by-case basis? Future litigation on federal habeas
corpus will provide the answer.
21 Supra note 1 at 1081.
22 Supra note 3 at 841.

